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AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF COLLECTIVE DELIBERATION
BY JACOB K. GOEREE AND LEEAT YARIV1
We study the effects of deliberation on collective decisions. In a series of experi-
ments, we vary groups’ preference distributions (between common and conflicting in-
terests) and the institutions by which decisions are reached (simple majority, two-thirds
majority, and unanimity). Without deliberation, different institutions generate signifi-
cantly different outcomes, tracking the theoretical comparative statics. Deliberation,
however, significantly diminishes institutional differences and uniformly improves ef-
ficiency. Furthermore, communication protocols exhibit an array of stable attributes:
messages are public, consistently reveal private information, provide a good predictor
for ultimate group choices, and follow particular (endogenous) sequencing.
KEYWORDS: Jury decision-making, deliberative voting, strategic voting.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Overview
RANGING FROM JURY DECISIONS to political elections, situations in which
groups of individuals determine a collective outcome are ubiquitous. There
are two important observations that pertain to almost all collective processes
observed in reality. First, decisions are commonly preceded by some form of
communication among individual decision-makers (such as jury deliberations
or election polls). Second, even when looking at a particular context, say U.S.
civil jurisdiction, there is great variance in the type of institutions that are em-
ployed to aggregate private information into group decisions.2
The recent theoretical literature has tried to assess the potential impacts of
communication on group decision processes, making strong assumptions on
the format of conversation (e.g., Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2005, 2006),
analyzing one-shot simultaneous communication, or Gerardi and Yariv (2007),
allowing for general cheap talk). While experimental and field investigations of
collective decisions progress hand in hand, there are several inherent difficul-
ties germane to field data in the context of group deliberation. First, the prior
inclinations of decision-makers, the accuracy of information, and so forth may
1We thank a co-editor and three anonymous referees for very helpful comments. We also thank
Gary Charness, Guillaume Frechette, Dino Gerardi, John Kagel, Alessandro Lizzeri, Tom Pal-
frey, and Lise Vesterlund for many useful conversations and suggestions. Lauren Feiler, Salvatore
Nunnari, and Julian Romero provided us with superb research assistance. We gratefully acknowl-
edge financial support from the National Science Foundation (SES 0551014) and the European
Research Council (ERC Advanced Grant, ESEI-249433).
2For example, in 30 state civil courts in the U.S., non-unanimous voting rules are employed that
range from 2/3 majority to 7/8 majority and anything in between; see State Court Organization
1998, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, available online at http://www.ojp.
usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/sco98.pdf.
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suffer from endogeneity problems as well as may be difficult to calibrate. Sec-
ond, protocols of conversation are rarely obtainable. Indeed, the existing field
analysis in the jury context uses either exit surveys or mock juries.3 Third, a
controlled comparison of institutions is very difficult practically. Juries serve
as a prime example in which communication is structured into the decision-
making process. Even for particular types of cases, there is great institutional
variance across state jurisdictions. Nonetheless, out-of-court settlements are
not fully documented and may be affected by the voting rule in place, which
makes for harsh empirical endogeneity problems (Priest and Klein (1984)).
The current paper reports observations from some of the first lab experi-
ments aimed at understanding the effects of different institutions on outcomes
when communication channels are available as well as the impact of different
preference distributions within a group on institutional performance. Further-
more, our design allows us to provide a characterization of the endogenous
formation of communication protocols under different institutions and group
preferences.
Specifically, we conducted an array of experiments that emulate a jury
decision-making process, in which groups of nine subjects were required to
make a collective decision between one of two alternatives (a neutral version
of acquittal or conviction). The returns to either alternative were randomly de-
termined according to the realization of an underlying state (such as a guilty
or innocent defendant) and each subject received a private signal about that
realization (similar to the subjective interpretations of testimonies in a trial).
We implemented a 3×3×2 design. Namely, we varied the distribution of pref-
erences among subjects (one distribution entailing common interests and two
allowing for different formats of heterogeneity), the institution or voting rule
by which the group decision was made (simple majority, 2/3 supermajority,
and unanimity), and the availability (or unavailability) of free-form communi-
cation.
Our experimental setup can be thought off as a metaphor for a wide variety
of settings, including not only jury voting, but also investment decisions by cor-
porate strategy committees, hiring and tenure decisions by university faculty,
performances rated by a group of judges, and more.
There are several insights that come out of our investigation. First, without
the ability to communicate, agents behave in a rather sophisticated strategic
manner. Across treatments, agents vote against their private information when
the informative equilibrium prescribes that they do so. While the experimental
observations do not match the Bayesian Nash predictions pointwise numeri-
cally, the data do reveal the theoretically predicted comparative statics across
voting rules and across preferences. One consequence of subjects’ strategic
behavior is that, absent communication, the efficiency of simple majoritarian
3For an overview of recent empirical research on deliberating juries, see Devine, Clayton,
Dunford, Seying, and Pryce (2001).
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rules is greater than that emerging from voting rules that require more consen-
sual decisions (see, e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998)).
The second, and possibly most important insight, is that free-form commu-
nication greatly improves efficiency as well as diminishes institutional differ-
ences. The extent to which institutional differences are mitigated depends on
the preference heterogeneity between individuals. In particular, when agents
have shared (or homogeneous) preferences, as much of the extant strategic
voting literature assumes (see below), there are no significant differences be-
tween outcomes under different voting rules when communication is available.
Furthermore, groups make choices that are consistent with the welfare maxi-
mizing decisions given the available aggregate information in the group.
These observations have important implications. On the one hand, they help
explain the great variety of institutions in what appear to be very similar con-
texts (such as trials of a particular type). Indeed, when the panel of decision-
makers can freely deliberate prior to making a collective decision, the insti-
tution in and of itself may not be crucial to outcomes. On the other hand,
these results suggest that from a policy perspective, affecting the communica-
tion protocols that precede decisions can serve as a vital design instrument.
The third chief insight pertains to the characteristics of the endogenously
created communication protocols. In our experiments, communication is pre-
dominantly public, nearly always truthful, and is a strong predictor of group
choice. Correct decisions are associated with shorter chats and higher fractions
of the conversations dedicated to information exchange. Furthermore, across
all treatments, protocols are consistently composed of two distinct phases—
information sharing and aggregation of opinions.
In fact, a schematic description of the procedure subjects utilize is as fol-
lows. Subjects first share their information (truthfully and publicly), then de-
cide collectively on the ultimate decision, and finally all vote for that option.
Indeed, voting in unison is the modal outcome in almost all of our communica-
tion treatments. Naturally, this procedure explains the similarity in outcomes
observed across voting rules when subjects deliberate.
1.2. Related Literature
A formal approach to the study of collective decision-making under uncer-
tainty originated with the work of Condorcet (1785), who considered group de-
cision problems in which members have a common interest but differ in their
beliefs about which alternative is correct. In particular, Condorcet considered a
model with two possible states of the world (e.g., a defendant who is innocent
or guilty) and individual group members, privately and imperfectly informed
about which state applies, who vote for one of two alternatives (e.g., acquit or
convict). The common interest assumption assures all group members readily
agree about which alternative to pick if information is public (i.e., all share the
same threshold of doubt for conviction). Differences in beliefs or preferences,
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however, create an information aggregation problem, making it harder for the
group to reach a consensus and draw the right conclusion.
Within the context of this simple 2 × 2 model, generally referred to as the
Condorcet jury model, Condorcet (1785) argued that majority is an efficient
voting rule to aggregate the group’s scattered pieces of information. Further-
more, he concluded that under majority rule, groups make better decisions
than individuals and large groups almost surely make the right choice. Con-
dorcet derived this “jury theorem” assuming individuals vote sincerely, that is,
their votes simply follow their private information.
Recent work, however, has shown that rational voters do not necessarily be-
have this way (see Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), Myerson (1998), Fedder-
sen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1997, 1998)). Since a vote matters only when it is
pivotal, a strategic agent considers the information contained in the event of
being pivotal, taking into account others’ strategies. In particular, Nash equilib-
rium strategies may involve strategic voting, where individuals go against their
private information. Moreover, equilibrium strategies systematically vary with
the voting rule.
There are two sets of conclusions this literature has produced. First, una-
nimity is expected to perform worse than non-unanimous voting rules. In fact,
under unanimity the probability of a wrongful conviction may increase with jury
size and is bounded away from zero as the jury size grows large. Second, as jury
size becomes infinitely large, non-unanimous voting rules fully aggregate the
available information and generate efficient outcomes.
The design of our experiments matches the theoretical setup of Feddersen
and Pesendorfer (1998). In particular, our design allows us to test for strate-
gic voting experimentally when communication is not available under different
voting rules and different preference distributions.
Recently, there have been several papers that analyzed the potential im-
pact of communication on collective choice outcomes. Coughlan (2000) and
Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2005, 2006) were among the first to point out
that the availability of particular communication protocols4 can dramatically
alter collective decisions, while Gerardi and Yariv (2007) showed that unre-
stricted communication (such as jury deliberation) renders a large class of vot-
ing rules equivalent in terms of the sets of sequential equilibrium outcomes
they generate.5 It is the latter paper that motivates the design of the experi-
mental sessions with communication. We allow for free-form communication,
4Coughlan (2000) considered straw polls and Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2005, 2006) con-
sidered one-stage simultaneous and public conversation. See also Elster (1998) for related work
in other fields.
5Lizzeri and Yariv (2011) achieved a similar result for certain environments when considering
communication protocols that entail a stage of costly information collection and a stage of col-
lective decision. Gerardi and Yariv (2008) effectively considered communication protocols as a
design instrument in a particular mechanism design setup pertaining to information acquisition
within collective choice. Meirowitz (2006) considered a mechanism design problem that gener-
ates incentives for protocols to be carried out in a particular way.
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study the emergent (endogenous) communication protocols, and compare the
outcomes generated by different institutions.
Experimentally, there have been several recent laboratory inquiries into
group decision-making. Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000) tested
some of the extreme Nash predictions by inspecting a jury (of size three and
six) and varying the voting rule (majority and unanimity). Their data confirm
the Nash prediction that unanimity rule triggers strategic voting; jurors with
an innocent signal mix between acquit and convict.6 In contrast, under major-
ity rule, voting tends to be sincere. Battaglini, Palfrey, and Morton (2010) also
identified strategic voting behavior in the form of the “swing-voter’s curse”
(Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996)). For an overview of political economy ex-
periments, see Palfrey (2006).
Communication is specifically incorporated in Dickson, Hafer, and Landa
(2008), who studied the interpretation of information by subjects in a one-
round protocol in which subjects (with potentially different preferences and
private information) simultaneously decide whether to speak or to listen.7
As a summary of the extant literature, we note that the experiments de-
scribed in this paper provide three important methodological innovations.
Most importantly, our study constitutes a first experimental inquiry of how
free-form communication affects institutional outcomes.8 In addition, we al-
low for intermediate voting rules in addition to majority and unanimity rules
(intermediate voting rules are surprisingly understudied in the formal litera-
ture in view of their prevalence). Finally, our experimental treatments include
juries with homogeneous and heterogeneous preferences.
1.3. Paper Structure
Section 2 describes the experimental design. The corresponding theoretical
predictions are analyzed in Section 3. We start the description of the experi-
6Ladha, Miller, and Oppenheimer (1999) provided experimental evidence for strategic voting
in a related setting. Bottom, Ladha, and Miller (2002) illustrated the implications of non-Bayesian
updating in the Condorcet world.
7McCubbins and Rodriguez (2006) considered a completely different setup with experimental
communication. Their subjects need to decide on a solution to an SAT problem (of unknown dif-
ficulty) and they allow subjects (with unknown math abilities) to communicate in one round (they
can send or not one signal, and listen or not to others’ signals). They showed that the quality of
individual decisions can decrease after such communication. In another different context, Cooper
and Kagel (2005) illustrated how team communication makes groups behave more strategically
as well as respond quicker to payoff changes than individuals. The effects of communication have
also been studied experimentally in other settings, for example, in partnerships as in Charness
and Dufwenberg (2006) or dictator games as in Andreoni and Rao (2009).
8Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000) allowed for restricted communication, that is,
deliberations taking the form of a straw poll vote (as in Coughlan (2000)). They found that voters
tend to expose their private information less than theory predicts and the impact on jury outcomes
is small. In contrast, the free-form communication allowed for in our experiments has a dramatic
effect on jury outcomes.
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mental observations in Section 4 in which we test for strategic voting. The col-
lective outcomes generated by each institution, with and without the possibility
to deliberate, are described in Section 5. A detailed analysis of the experimen-
tal communication protocols appears in Section 6. The protocols’ effects on
experimental juries’ behavior is discussed in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The underlying setup of our experimental design replicates the character-
istics of Condorcet’s simple model. There is a “red” jar and a “blue” jar: the
red jar contains seven red and three blue balls, and the blue jar contains seven
blue and three red balls. Throughout the paper, we use the red (blue) jar as a
metaphor for a guilty (innocent) defendant. At the start of each period, sub-
jects are randomized into a group of nine subjects (who are assigned labels 1–9
randomly) and one of the jars is chosen by a toss of a fair coin. Subjects receive
private information and ultimately need to cast a vote pertaining to their guess
of which jar had been chosen and are each paid according to their own and
their (eight) fellow group members’ guesses. There are four important com-
ponents of our experimental design: the private information each subject gets,
subjects’ ability to interact, the voting rule in place, and subjects’ preferences.9
Information: In each period, after the jar had been selected, each of the
nine jurors in a group receives an independent draw (with replacement) from
the jar being used. The color of the drawn ball matches the jar’s color with
probability q = 07, commonly referred to as the accuracy of the private signal.
Communication: In the no communication or “no-chat” treatments, sub-
jects cast their guesses immediately after observing their private draws. In the
communication or “chat” treatments, subjects can communicate with one an-
other via a chat screen that automatically opens when subjects receive their
private draws. They are able to direct their messages to a subset of their group
or to the group as a whole (i.e., send a public message). Messages can take
any form and communication is not restricted in time. When subjects are done
chatting, they cast their votes for red or blue.
Voting Rules: Once all votes have been received, they are automatically
tallied to determine the group outcome. The voting rule, explained to the sub-
jects at the outset of the experiment, is a threshold rule, where the red jar is the
group choice if and only if at least (a prespecified) r red votes are submitted.
There are three types of treatments, corresponding to three different voting
rules: r = 5 (simple majority), r = 7 (two-thirds majority), and r = 9 (unanim-
ity).
Preferences: Subjects’ payoffs, which depend on whether the group deci-
sion matches the jar being used, vary by treatment. In the homogeneous treat-
9The experimental instructions are available in the Supplemental Material (Goeree and Yariv
(2011)).
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ment, subjects’ preferences are completely aligned. In the heterogeneous treat-
ment, subjects are randomly assigned (with equal probabilities) the role of
weak red or weak blue partisan, which causes a misalignment in preferences.
The weak red (weak blue) partisans are pre-disposed to choose the red (blue)
jar or, in other words, require stronger information favoring the blue (red) jar
to prefer it. This misalignment is even stronger in the partisan treatment, where
jurors are assigned the role of strong red partisan with probability 1/6, a role
in which the red outcome is preferred regardless of the realized jar. Subjects
are informed of the ex ante distribution of preferences and their own realized
preferences in each round (but not the full realization of preferences in their
group). The top panel of Table I displays the payoffs (in cents) used in the
different treatments.
To summarize, the experiments employ a 3 × 3 × 2 design based on varia-
tions in voting rules, jurors’ preferences, and the availability of communication
among the subjects. Each experimental session implemented one particular
voting rule and one particular preference distribution. Within sessions, we con-
ducted 15 periods without communication followed by 15 periods with commu-
nication (with one practice round preceding each). Three of the sessions were
repeated with the chat periods preceding the no-chat periods to check for or-
der effects. These “reverse order” sessions led to qualitatively identical insights
as our baseline treatments. In our analysis below, we therefore pool the data
from both types of sessions.10
The experiments were conducted at the California Social Sciences Exper-
imental Laboratory (CASSEL) at UCLA. The bottom panel of Table I de-
scribes the number of subjects participating in each of the treatments (where
summands correspond to separate sessions). Overall, 549 subjects participated.
The average payoff per subject from the no-chat segment of each session was
$9.53, while the corresponding average payoff in the chat segment was $13.11.
In addition, each subject received a $5 show-up fee.
3. THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS
Our experimental design matches the basic jury setup introduced by Fed-
dersen and Pesendorfer (1998). Formally, consider a group of n = 2k + 1 in-
dividuals (subjects, jurors, etc.) who collectively choose one out of two alter-
natives, {redblue} (as suggested above, this can be understood as a metaphor
for a choice between convicting or acquitting a defendant) using a threshold
voting rule parameterized by r = 1     n. That is, red (convict) is chosen if
and only if at least r agents vote in favor of it. In our experimental treat-
ments, n = 9 and r = 579. At the outset, a state of nature is chosen ran-
domly from {RB} (experimentally, red or blue jar; metaphorically, guilty or
10Separate analysis of the sessions in which rounds with communication preceded the rounds
without communication is available from the authors upon request.
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TABLE I
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Homogeneous Heterogeneous Partisan
Neutral [1] Weak Red Partisan [1/2] Neutral [5/6]
True Jar Red True Jar Blue True Jar Red True Jar Blue True Jar Red True Jar Blue
Preferences
Jury choice red 100 10 150 10 100 10
Jury choice blue 10 100 10 50 10 100
Weak Blue Partisan [1/2] Strong Red Partisan [1/6]
True Jar Red True Jar Blue True Jar Red True Jar Blue
Jury choice red 50 10 150 50
Jury choice blue 10 150 10 25
r = 5 r = 7 r = 9 r = 5 r = 7 r = 9 r = 5 r = 7 r = 9
Subjects
No chat, chat 36 27a + 36b + 45b 27 18 + 45bc 27 + 45b 36 + 45bd 27 36 36
Chat, no chat N/A N/A 18 27 18 N/A N/A N/A N/A
aChat treatment was run for 18 rounds (in addition to the practice round).
bOnly the no-chat treatment was run.
cChat treatment was run for only 9 rounds (in addition to the practice round).
dThis session was run for only 9 rounds (in addition to the practice round).
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innocent defendant), and individuals’ private preference types are randomized
from T = {neutralweak red partisanweak blue partisan strong red partisan}
according to the prior probability p = (pNpWRpWBpSR). Utility mappings
for each type are determined naturally according to Table I. After preference
types had been determined, each agent observes a conditionally independent
signal s ∈ {redblue} of accuracy q That is,
Pr(s = red|R)= Pr(s = blue|B)= q
where q = 07 in all our experimental treatments.
After observing all of their private information (composed of preference
type and signal), when communication is not available, agents vote simulta-
neously, the group choice is determined according to r, and agents’ earn-
ings are determined accordingly. In our experimental design, each treat-
ment corresponds to a different prior p. In particular, in the homogeneous
treatment, pN = 1 in the heterogeneous treatment, pWR = pWB = 12 , and in
the partisan treatment, pN = 56 and pSP = 16  A strategy is then a mapping
σ :T × {redblue} → [01], which associates a probability of choosing red (or
convict) for each realization of private preference type and revealed signal. We
concentrate on symmetric responsive equilibria in which agents of the same ex-
tended type (comprising preference type and private signal) use the same strat-
egy, and not all extended types use the same strategy. Using the techniques of
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), we identify the equilibrium strategies gen-
erated by the assortment of our experimental sessions.
Consider first the homogeneous treatments. When pN = 1 and r = k + 1
the unique symmetric equilibrium entails agents following their signals, that is,
selecting red (blue) when observing red (blue), as in Austen-Smith and Banks
(1996). Intuitively, if all agents follow their signals, then a pivotal agent knows
that precisely k agents observed the signal red and k agents observed the sig-
nal blue. These signals cancel one another, and the agent best responds by
following her own signal.
For r > k+ 1 this sincere behavior is no longer part of an equilibrium. In-
deed, if all agents vote sincerely, then pivotality implies that there are at least
two more red signals in the group, implying a best response of red regardless
of one’s signal. As it turns out, for r > k+1 the unique responsive equilibrium
entails agents with a red signal voting red and those with a blue signal mixing
between a red and a blue vote. Let the equilibrium probability of choosing red
when observing a blue signal be α Then, after simplifying terms, we get
Pr(red|pivotal) = Pr(red|r − 1 red votes, n− r blue votes)
= [q+ (1 − q)α]r−1[(1 − q)(1 − α)]n−r
/
([q+ (1 − q)α]r−1[(1 − q)(1 − α)]n−r
+ [1 − q+ qα]r−1[q(1 − α)]n−r)
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which, for indifference, must equal q. The solution of this equality for different
values of qn and r identifies the corresponding equilibria, as they appear in
the top panel of Table II for q = 07 n= 9 and r = 79.
The analysis of the heterogeneous and partisan treatments is similar in spirit
and, therefore, is omitted. Table II summarizes all equilibrium predictions ger-
mane to our no-communication experimental sessions, as well as the probabil-
ities of the different errors, associated with choosing R (red or convict) when
the state is actually B (blue or innocent) or, alternatively, choosing B (blue
or acquit) when the state is actually R (red or guilty).11 The former is often
referred to in the jury literature as the probability of convicting the innocent,
which is thus denoted Pr(C|I) while the latter is referred to as the probability
of acquitting the guilty and denoted Pr(A|G)
4. STRATEGIC VOTING
4.1. Aggregate Analysis
We start by considering the extent to which subjects behaved strategically.
Table III summarizes the relevant results for all sessions. Numbers in paren-
theses correspond to theoretical predictions.12 As will be seen in Section 6, in
the treatments that allow for communication, subjects revealed their private
signals at very high rates across treatments. We therefore report the aggregate
choices in those sessions as a pair of percentages x%/y%, where x% (y%) is
the appropriate percentage of choices when, given the agent’s preferences and
the entire signal profile, the optimal decision was red (blue). Thus, a best re-
sponse to truthful revelation would constitute of the pair 100%/0%.13 Strong
partisans had a dominant action entailing a vote for red; therefore, we report
their aggregate choices only.14 Last, for the homogeneous case, there is an ap-
pealing equilibrium (in terms of Pareto optimality or efficiency) in which all
11The multiplicity of equilibria in the heterogeneous case when r = 7 or r = 9 is inherent
for symmetric settings in which there are weak red and weak blue partisans. In particular, this
multiplicity could not be avoided by specifying different symmetric rewards for correct matches
between group choice and actual states for both types of partisans.
12Since there are multiple equilibria for the heterogeneous treatment, we do not include any
theoretical predictions for the corresponding sessions. The theoretical error predictions are based
on the equilibrium strategies and realized signal profiles in the experimental sessions.
13For instance, in the heterogeneous treatment, red types require only 4 out of 9 signals to be
red for red to be the optimal choice. So, for example, under simple majority (r = 5), 93% of the
time in which there were at least 4 red signals and a red type received a red signal, she voted
red. Similarly, blue types require 6 out of 9 red signals to prefer red over blue and numbers are
calculated accordingly.
14Partisan subjects did not always use their dominant action. This can be explained by either a
desire to conform or match the winner (see Goeree and Yariv (2007)) combined with probability
matching (Siegel and Goldstein (1959)), or some form of altruism (particularly in the case of the
two supermajoritarian rules), as in Feddersen, Gailmard, and Sandroni (2009). We return to their
behavior in some of the individual-level analysis below.
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TABLE II
THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS
r = 5 r = 7 r = 9
Homogeneous Red votes with red signals 1 1 1
Red votes with blue signals 0 0.31 0.77
Pr(red|blue) [= Pr(C|I)] 0099 0.108 0.206
Pr(blue|red) [= Pr(A|G)] 0099 0.280 0.474
Eq. (1) Eq. (2) Eq. (3) Eq. (4) Eq. (1) Eq. (2) Eq. (3)
Heterogeneous Weak red partisans
Red votes with red signals 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Red votes with blue signals 1 1 1 032 1 1 1 1
Weak blue partisans
Red votes with red signals 0 041 064 0 0 014 002 0
Red votes with blue signals 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pr(red|blue) [= Pr(C|I)] 05 0166 0224 0002 05 0003 0002 05
Pr(blue|red) [= Pr(A|G)] 05 0678 0472 0972 05 0995 0998 05
Partisan Strong red partisans
Red votes with red signals 1 1 1
Red votes with blue signals 1 1 1
Neutrals
Red votes with red signals 097 1 1
Red votes with blue signals 0 0.18 0.72
Pr(red|blue) [ = Pr(C|I)] 0286 0.113 0.201
Pr(blue|red) [ = Pr(A|G)] 0064 0.275 0.48
904
J.K
.G
O
E
R
E
E
A
N
D
L
.Y
A
R
IV
TABLE III
STRATEGIC VOTING ACROSS TREATMENTS
Without Communication With Communication
r = 5 r = 7 r = 9 r = 5 r = 7 r = 9
Homogeneous
Number of individual decisions 540 1620 675 540 486 675
Number of group decisions 60 180 75 60 54 75
Red votes with red signal 91% (100%) 89% (100%) 90% (100%) 99%/36% 98%/10% 98%/10%
Red votes with blue signal 7% (0%) 24% (31%) 39% (77%) 69%/5% 91%/5% 95%/4%
Wrong jury outcomes 10% (8%) 35% (22%) 48% (40%) 10% [7%] 7% [5%] 8% [8%]
True jar blue 7% (10%) 5% (10%) 0% (21%) 16% [9%] 7% [3%] 5% [8%]
True jar red 13% (6%) 60% (30%) 97% (54%) 4% [4%] 7% [6%] 11% [8%]
Heterogeneous
Number of individual decisions 1080 1350 945 675 675 540
Number of group decisions 120 150 105 75 75 60
Red types
Red vales with red signal 86% 88% 91% 93%/25% 82%/33% 84%/6%
Red votes with blue signal 37% 44% 49% 78%/3% 56%/6% 72%/11%
Blue types
Red votes with red signal 64% 59% 62% 91%/44% 84%/28% 84%/38%
Red votes with blue signal 16% 15% 19% 91%/13% 73%/12% 73%/24%
Wrong jury outcomes 23% 41% 60% 7% 13% 30%
True jar blue 24% 4% 0% 11% 3% 10%
True jar red 23% 83% 100% 3% 22% 52%
(Continues)
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TABLE III—Continued
Without Communication With Communication
r = 5 r = 7 r = 9 r = 5 r = 7 r = 9
Partisan
Number of individual decisions 405 540 540 405 540 540
Number of group decisions 45 60 60 45 60 60
Neutral types
Red votes with red signal 91% (97%) 90% (100%) 71% (100%) 100%/16% 98%/41% 80%/33%
Red votes with blue signal 18% (0%) 21% (18%) 28% (72%) 95%/2% 82%/17% 38%/8%
Partisan types
Red votes with red signal 81% (100%) 90% (100%) 68% (100%) 83% (100%) 90% (100%) 82% (100%)
Red votes with blue signal 57% (100%) 45% (100%) 50% (100%) 48% (100%) 47% (100%) 42% (100%)
Wrong jury outcomes 27% (23%) 25% (16%) 43% (34%) 9% 13% 15%
True jar blue 36% (35%) 3% (9%) 0% (20%) 12% 21% 4%
True jar red 12% (3%) 48% (23%) 100% (52%) 5% 8% 22%
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agents reveal their signals and vote for the commonly preferred alternative.
The errors that would have resulted in the experiment with such behavior are
reported in the square brackets in the top panel.
There are several insights one gains by inspecting Table III. First of all, in
the homogeneous and partisan no-communication treatments, behavior gen-
erally follows the comparative statics (if not the precise numbers) predicted
by theory. In particular, voting against one’s blue signal under rules r = 7 and
r = 9 is significantly different than 0 for any conventional levels of confidence.
Furthermore, voting against a blue signal increases in a significant way with the
voting rules (again, for any conventional levels of confidence).15 Nonetheless,
in all of our treatments, subjects took at least 20% longer to make a decision
when ultimately voting against their signal, suggesting that voting against one’s
signal may involve a more complex cognitive process.16
The qualitative deviations from the theoretical predictions pertain to the
probability of convicting an innocent defendant (i.e., the probability that the
group outcome is red when the blue jar is being used).17 In the homogeneous
and partisan no-communication treatments, this probability declines with the
size r of the supermajority needed for conviction (a choice of red). This com-
parative static, which is not predicted by theory, has been observed before in
the experiments of Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000), who focused
on simple majority and unanimity. Furthermore, under unanimous voting rules
(r = 9), convictions (red choices) are hardly observed, and so wrong convic-
tions (Pr(C|I)) are rare. Indeed, without the ability to communicate, it is hard
to achieve a unanimous profile of votes. This is important from a policy per-
spective, as the levels of Pr(C|I) are often the object of minimization when as-
sessing institutions. In the lab, absent deliberation, unanimous rules generate
very low innocent convictions (see also Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey
(2000)).
Looking at the communication treatments, Table III illustrates that subjects
respond to the entire profile of signals available in their group, although they
appear to place too much weight on their own signals (conditional on full reve-
lation). This ties to the reduced overall probabilities of wrong outcomes when
communication is available. Note, however, that under unanimity, the prob-
abilities of wrong outcomes when the jar is blue (wrongful convictions) are
15Results for homogeneous preferences can readily be compared to those obtained by Guar-
naschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000) for groups of size 3 and 6, and majoritarian and unani-
mous voting rules. Our observations are consistent with those reported there.
16Voting with the signal took an average of 414, 551 and 305 seconds within the homoge-
neous, heterogeneous, and partisan treatments, respectively. Voting against one’s signal took an
average of 513, 722 and 367 seconds within the respective homogeneous, heterogeneous, and
partisan treatments. All differences were significant at any reasonable level.
17The theoretical values concerning wrong decisions (bottom three rows in each panel) capture
the probabilities that would have been generated had subjects used the theoretical equilibrium
strategies for the experimental signal realizations.
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significantly higher with communication than without at any conventional con-
fidence level. Indeed, as will be shown below, subjects can more easily create a
majority, super-majority, or even a unanimous vote for red when deliberation
precedes choice.
Throughout the paper, we report results from all sessions. It is important to
note that when looking at sessions in which the order of the communication
and no-communication treatment was reversed, we see very little difference in
strategic behavior18 and wrong jury outcomes occur at similar, though slightly
lower, frequencies.
4.2. Individual Behavior
To uncover the determinants of strategic voting and to test for learning, we
estimate a discrete choice model on each individual’s decision to vote red as
a function of several explanatory variables. In addition to dummy variables
corresponding to voting rules 7 and 9, we consider several additional dummy
variables: red sample takes the value 1 when the subject’s signal is red; red type
takes the value of 1 when the subject is a weak red partisan in the hetero-
geneous treatments, and when the subject is a strong partisan in the partisan
treatments; past wrong blue dec(ision) takes the value of 1 when blue was the
outcome in the previous round and ended up not coinciding with the realized
state, and thereby allows us to identify reinforcement forces; late allows us to
account for learning by taking the value of 1 when the decision is taken in the
last 5 periods of the session. In addition, number of red signals captures the
number of red signals in the group, and we consider several natural interaction
terms. Table IV contains the marginal effects that correspond to our estima-
tions (where errors are clustered by subject).
Several insights come out of these estimations. First, and in line with our
aggregate analysis, subjects put significant weight on their private informa-
tion captured by our red sample variable. They do so in a significantly more
prominent manner in the treatments without communication. As we will see
below, subjects frequently reveal their private information in the communica-
tion treatments. Therefore, the number of red signals variable is a proxy for the
public information available in the communication treatments. Table IV illus-
trates the significant impact of the group’s information whenever communica-
tion is possible (in fact, in the homogeneous and heterogeneous treatments,
two additional red signals within the group influence behavior approximately
as much as a private red signal, while in the partisan treatment an additional
red signal in the group outweighs the effect of a private red signal). Second,
18For the sessions with homogeneous preferences and r = 9 in which reversed sessions were
run and theoretical predictions are unique, looking at votes for red with red signal and with blue
signal, we get p-values that correspond to differences in the baseline sessions of 082 and 062,
respectively.
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TABLE IV
PROBIT ESTIMATIONS THAT EXPLAIN RED INDIVIDUAL DECISIONSa
Preferences
Homogeneous Heterogenous Partisan
Communication: No Yes No Yes No Yes
Red sample 0814∗∗∗ 0504∗∗∗ 0514∗∗∗ 0248∗∗∗ 0711∗∗∗ 0226∗∗∗
(0069) (0072) (0047) (0071) (0070) (0082)
Past wrong blue decision −0044 −0088 −0005 −00002 −00328 0209∗∗∗
(0043) (0122) (0036) (0070) (0058) (0060)
Rule 7 0271∗∗∗ −0426∗ 0001 0104 0010 0644∗∗∗
(0103) (0219) (0062) (0168) (0105) (0099)
Rule 9 0385∗∗∗ −0611∗∗ 0052 0228 0119 0234
(0066) (0296) (0062) (0183) (0085) (0218)
Number of red signals 0220∗∗∗ 0221∗∗∗ 0360∗∗∗
(0027) (0030) (0043)
Red sample ∗ rule 7 −0311∗ −0422∗∗∗ −0029 −0051 0025 0055
(0184) (0076) (0081) (0106) (0157) (0093)
Red sample ∗ rule 9 −0449∗∗∗ −0485∗∗∗ −0050 −0162∗∗ −0349∗∗∗ −0061
(0131) (0074) (0079) (0079) (0120) (0099)
Late 00003 −0644∗∗∗ 0026 −0292∗∗ 0014 −0320∗
(0057) (0187) (0049) (0120) (0056) (0185)
Late ∗ red sample 0049 0076 −0083∗ −0184∗∗ −0075 −0072
(0045) (0121) (0045) (0073) (0065) (0071)
Late ∗ rule 7 0070 −0003 −0048 0078 −0004 0155∗∗
(0067) (0093) (0057) (0052) (0087) (0072)
Late ∗ rule 9 0012 0094 −0072 0219∗∗∗ −0044 0206∗∗∗
(0059) (0093) (0062) (0056) (0080) (0078)
Late ∗ past wrong blue dec −0122 0158 0003 0033 −0052 −0041
(0082) (0167) (0059) (0134) (0108) (0154)
Late ∗ number of red signals 0152∗∗ 0052∗∗ 0066∗
(0064) (0024) (0037)
Number of red signals ∗ rule 7 0136∗∗ −0047 −0186∗∗∗
(0054) (0040) (0050)
Number of red signals ∗ rule 9 0219∗∗∗ −0054 −0067
(0085) (0042) (0058)
Red type 0257∗∗∗ −0106 0309∗∗∗ 0451∗∗∗
(0048) (0105) (0070) (0036)
Red type ∗ past wrong blue dec 0016 0080 −0007 −0182
(0039) (0121) (0122) (0202)
Red type ∗ rule 7 0084 0010 −0032 −0449∗∗∗
(0055) (0075) (0106) (0125)
Red type ∗ rule 9 0088 0019 −0059 −0463∗∗∗
(0075) (0082) (0095) (0126)
Red type ∗ red sample 0031 0007 −0353∗∗∗ −0063
(0038) (0063) (0069) (0114)
Red type ∗ number of red signals 0055∗∗ −0050∗
(0023) (0027)
Pseudo-R2 0.376 0.710 0.218 0.465 0.28 0.620
Observations 2835 1701 3375 1890 1485 1485
aRobust standard errors are given in parentheses. *Significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant
at 1% level.
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voting rules have some effect on behavior and response to private signals, but
the effect is limited and appears most dominant in the homogeneous pref-
erence treatments. Third, types have some effect on behavior, particularly in
treatments with strong red partisans. In these treatments, partisan subjects,
for whom a red vote is a weakly dominant action, vote red at a significantly
greater frequency (notably under the non-unanimous voting rules). Last, learn-
ing seemed to play a limited role. Indeed, behavior in later periods is, for the
most part, not significantly different than early behavior when communication
is unavailable. With communication, subjects did tend to choose the red action
less frequently at later periods. Nonetheless, the reaction to the environment
(as captured by the interaction terms) did not change significantly across the
experimental periods.
In relation to our theoretical predictions, note that in the treatments without
communication, individual equilibrium choices depend on the voting rule, the
private sample, and the private preference type. This conforms with what we
observe using our regression analysis, implying again a qualitative match of
our subjects’ behavior with the theoretical predictions when communication
was unavailable.
In what follows, we analyze how this individual behavior aggregates into
group decisions, which will allow us to assess outcomes of the institutions we
consider.
5. VOTING OUTCOMES
A natural object when comparing institutions is the resulting outcome, that
is, the mapping from the characteristics of the group (preferences, informa-
tion, etc.) to final decisions (e.g., probabilities of conviction in a jury). Theo-
retically, without communication, the different voting rules generate different
outcomes for any of the preference distributions (see Table II). On the other
hand, the availability of free-form communication yields an equivalence of the
set of outcomes generated by intermediate voting rules (and to a subset of
outcomes under unanimity).
Comparison of outcomes is particularly important when making policy de-
cisions. It is the natural basis upon which to choose one institution over the
other, as it captures information about the likelihood of specific decisions (say,
conviction or acquittal) for particular profiles of agents (e.g., jurors’ political
stands) and available information (such as testimonies).
We start with the homogeneous treatments, which are the easiest to analyze
in that characteristics of the group can be fully summarized by the number of
red signals in the group. In these treatments, symmetry assures that outcomes
are encapsulated formally by the correspondence between the number of red
signals in the group and the eventual probability of collectively choosing the
red jar. Table V contains the experimental outcomes with and without commu-
nication.
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TABLE V
FREQUENCY OF RED CHOICES/CONVICTIONS WHEN PREFERENCES ARE HOMOGENEOUSa
Without Communication With Communication
Number of Red Signals r = 5 r = 7 r = 9 r = 5 r = 7 r = 9
0 — (0) 0% (2) 0% (2) — (0) — (0) 0% (1)
1 0% (3) 0% (11) 0% (8) 0% (4) 0% (5) 0% (12)
2 0% (12) 0% (30) 0% (10) 0% (9) 0% (4) 0% (9)
3 0% (9) 0% (21) 0% (11) 0% (10) 0% (8) 0% (8)
4 25% (4) 0% (19) 0% (8) 29% (7) 10% (10) 0% (7)
5 56% (9) 24% (25) 0% (9) 100% (4) 50% (4) 60% (5)
6 100% (8) 29% (31) 0% (12) 100% (9) 100% (9) 100% (17)
7 100% (7) 54% (24) 0% (9) 100% (9) 100% (10) 100% (11)
8 100% (7) 81% (11) 0% (5) 100% (7) 100% (3) 100% (4)
9 100% (1) 100% (6) 100% (1) 100% (1) 100% (1) 100% (1)
aParentheses contain the corresponding number of observations.
Table V illustrates the stark differences between outcomes that institutions
can impose when communication is not available. For simple majority (r = 5),
the empirical outcome approximates the statistically efficient outcome (pre-
scribing a guess of red with 100% probability whenever 5 or more signals within
the group are red, and a guess of blue, that is, a guess of red with 0% proba-
bility, otherwise) rather well. However, under unanimity, subjects are unable
to reach a consensus of red votes and the resulting outcome yields significantly
less efficient outcomes.
The availability of communication overturns these results. Once communi-
cation is available, empirical outcomes are both nearly efficient as well strik-
ingly similar across the different voting rules. Outcomes coincide across all
voting rules when there are less than 4 or more than 5 red signals. When there
are 4 or 5 signals, rule r = 5 generates different outcomes than the other rules
r = 7 and r = 9 which generate outcomes that are not significantly different
from one another (with a p-value of 0518 corresponding to the null that the
two rules do not generate different outcomes).19
In fact, a (nonparametric) Fisher exact probability test on group decisions
rejects outcomes being identical across voting rules without communication
when the number of red signals is 5–8 at conventional significance levels. When
communication is available, no pairwise comparison, for any number of red
19While communication may seem simple to conduct when agents share preferences, a large
segment of the theoretical literature analyzing institutions has focused on this particular case.
The results suggest the importance of accounting for communication in such circumstances.
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signals or two voting rules, generated a difference significant with 10% confi-
dence.2021
When preferences are heterogeneous, the analysis is complicated by the fact
that it matters who holds either kind of signal. For example, a weak red partisan
observing a red signal may affect decisions differently than a weak blue partisan
observing a red signal.
The effect of communication on outcomes is illustrated in Table VI, which
shows the percentage of red choices (convictions) when the majority of sig-
nals in the group are red or blue for the different treatments, together with
their 95% confidence intervals (approximating a normal distribution). Table VI
highlights the observation that groups are highly responsive to the majority of
signals within the group. For non-unanimous rules, whenever the majority of
signals are red, the probability the group outcome is red exceeds 84%, regard-
less of the preference distribution and voting rule. Whenever the majority of
signals are blue, the probability the group outcome is red is lower than 13%
for all preference distributions and voting rules (including unanimous ones).
In particular, the outcomes corresponding to different rules appear rather sim-
ilar.2223
20While the numbers reflecting rates of red choices as a function of number of red signals
do not, strictly speaking, represent a cumulative distribution, they are monotonically increasing
from 0 to 1 If one were to then use the (nonparametric) Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, similar
results would emerge when the null is taken to be that two voting rules are identical. The values
corresponding to any two rules when communication is unavailable are lower than 00001 When
communication is available, the comparison of rules 5 and 7 leads to a value of 0466 of rules 5
and 9 to a value of 0255, and of rules 7 and 9 to a value of 1
21We note that similar conclusions can be drawn using regression analysis. Indeed, suppose a
group’s decision (a dummy achieving the value of 1 when the group decision is red) is explained
by the voting rule in place (accounted for by two of the voting rules, say, r = 7 and r = 9 or r = 5
and r = 9) when controlling for the number of red signals being 4 or 5 (and their interactions
with the voting rules). The corresponding probit regression yields all of the coefficients regarding
voting rules as not significantly different from 0.
22In fact, looking at the 95% confidence intervals, we gain very similar insights. With the ex-
ception of unanimous voting with heterogeneous preferences, the lower bound of the 95% con-
fidence interval corresponding to a majority of red signals in the group exceeds 80% across all
treatments. Similarly, the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval corresponding to a major-
ity of blue signals in the group lies below 17% across all treatments (for the homogeneous and
heterogeneous treatments, it is below 10%).
23Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests generate similar messages. Without communication, a
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test to compare group decisions across voting rules leads to a rejection
of the null hypothesis that outcomes are the same across voting rules when communication is
not available (at any conventional level of significance). Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests do not reject
the coincidence of outcomes across voting rules r = 5 and r = 7 when conditioning on the more
prevalent signal within the group. Outcomes from voting rule r = 9 are significantly different
than those corresponding to rules r = 5 and r = 7 when the majority of red signals are red in
the heterogeneous treatment (at 5% level) and the partisan treatment (at 10% level). For those
treatments, unanimity generates significantly less red outcomes (convictions) when the informa-
tion suggests red (guilt) is more likely. In all other cases of Table VI, voting rule r = 9 generates
statistically similar outcomes to those produced under rules r = 57
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TABLE VI
PERCENTAGE OF RED CHOICES/CONVICTIONS WITH COMMUNICATIONa
Preferences
Homogeneous Heterogeneous Partisans
Voting Rule: r = 5 r = 7 r = 9 r = 5 r = 7 r = 9 r = 5 r = 7 r = 9
Majority red 100% 92.6% 94.7% 97.6% 84.2% 51.7% 100% 97.2% 84.4%
signals [100%, 100%] [89.3%, 95.9%] [92.4%, 97.1%] [96.0%, 99.1%] [80.3%, 88.1%] [45.7%, 57.8%] [100%, 100%] [95.4%, 99.0%] [80.2%, 88.6%]
Majority blue 6.7% 3.7% 0% 5.9% 2.7% 6.5% 4% 12.5% 10.7%
signals [3.7%, 9.6%] [1.3%, 6.1%] [0%, 0%] [3.2%, 8.5%] [1.0%, 4.4%] [3.6%, 9.3%] [1.4%, 6.6%] [8.1%, 16.9%] [6.9%, 14.5%]
aSquare bracket contain corresponding 95% confidence intervals.
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To conclude, without communication different voting rules yield significantly
different group outcomes. The availability of communication reduces the ef-
fects of voting rules on outcomes. Specifically, non-unanimous voting rules
generate similar outcomes in all of our experimental circumstances. Unani-
mous rules make it harder for groups to achieve the red outcome (conviction)
and, therefore, appear different at times when the majority of signals in the
group are red. Even this difference vanishes when preferences are homoge-
neous.
In terms of efficiency, individuals’ response to group information is echoed
in the generated outcomes that are significantly more efficient in the presence
of communication. From a policy perspective, this suggests that deliberation
may be an important instrument for design, and, when introduced, voting rules
in and of themselves may be far less so.
In the next section we analyze the communication protocols that emerged
and gain more understanding regarding how group outcomes are determined
in the presence of communication.
6. COMMUNICATION PROTOCOLS
6.1. Aggregate Protocol Characteristics
We start by reporting general properties of the communication protocols.
Table VII summarizes the percentage of agents reporting truthfully their sig-
nals, misreporting their private signals (in the “lies” rubric), or not revealing
anything regarding their private information. Furthermore, we account for the
percentage of messages (truthful or not) that were sent publicly to the entire
group.24
As can be seen, across treatments, a striking percentage of subjects reveal
their signals truthfully and almost all subjects send messages to their entire
group.
These results contrast with those regarding voting without communication.
While subjects are perfectly capable of behaving strategically when casting a
vote, they are not very strategic when sending messages. Indeed, given that
subjects react to group signals in a substantial way (see, e.g., Table IV), partisan
subjects in the heterogeneous or partisan treatments would have an incentive
to misrepresent signals that go against their leaning.25
Table VII also reports the average number of messages conveying signal re-
alizations and the average number of messages conveying individual types (that
24The coding was done for the sessions in which no communication preceded the communica-
tion treatments. All coding was done by two independent research assistants who were not privy
to our research questions.
25This is consistent with “excessive” truthful reporting observed in other experimental setups,
such as the Crawford and Sobel (1982) setting; see Cai and Wang (2006).
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TABLE VII
AGGREGATE MESSAGE PROFILES
Messages
Truthful Lies Nothing Public
Average Number of
Signal Messages
Average Number of
Type Messages
Homogeneous
r = 5 90% 10% 0% 100% 867 —
r = 7 98% 2% 0% 96% 849 —
r = 9 98% 2% 0% 100% 1388 —
Heterogeneous
r = 5 88% 12% 0% 100% 1379 0.21
r = 7 88% 10% 2% 100% 1550 0.77
r = 9 89% 10% 1% 100% 867 1.20
Partisan
r = 5 93% 6% 1% 100% 792 0.04
r = 7 89% 9% 2% 100% 791 0.31
r = 9 92% 8% 0% 100% 809 0.16
are relevant for the heterogeneous and partisan treatments). The former is sig-
nificantly greater than the latter. In fact, type revelation occurs very rarely. For
example, in the partisan treatments, the average number of types revealed is
significantly lower than 05 with any conventional significance levels.
It is worth noting that in the homogeneous treatments, unanimous chat ses-
sions were (insignificantly) faster than majoritarian ones. The average round
length under unanimity (majority) was 39±9 (55±9) seconds.26 In the hetero-
geneous treatments, however, communication was significantly longer under
unanimity (96 ± 13 seconds) than under simple majority (26 ± 11 seconds) or
2/3 supermajority (36 ± 13 seconds).
6.2. Sequencing
To gain insights regarding the endogenous formation of communication pro-
tocols, we identified messages that contained information about private signals
and messages that had to do with suggestions regarding how the group or par-
ticular individuals should act. 27
Figure 1 depicts the sequencing of messages as follows. We normalized the
length of all conversations within a treatment to 20 periods. For each period,
26This relates to Blinder and Morgan (2005), who conducted an experiment in which groups
were required to solve two problems: a statistical urn problem and a monetary policy puzzle.
The groups could converse before casting their votes. They found no significant difference in the
decision lag when group decisions were made by majority rule relative to when they were made
under a unanimity requirement. See Cooper and Kagel (2005) for another related study.
27Again, these were coded by an independent research assistant.
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FIGURE 1.—Sequencing within communication protocols. The x axis denotes normalized period and the y axis denotes percentage of signal or
suggestion messages on left or right panels, respectively.
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we calculated the percentage of messages sent that contained signals or sugges-
tions as described above. Each rubric of the figure corresponds to a different
treatment and contains two graphs: the left one depicting the evolution of sig-
nal messages; the right one illustrating the evolution of suggestion messages.28
Roughly speaking, conversations are consistently composed of two phases.
First, subjects exchange information. Later, they converse about how to act on
the collective information. This depiction is true across the different prefer-
ence settings and the different voting rules.
This split into phases allows us to identify “leaders,” subjects who consis-
tently make suggestions for group and individual ultimate decisions. As it turns
out, leaders do not always appear. Some sessions had unique individuals who
sent numerous messages (namely, the homogeneous treatment with simple
majority or the partisan treatment with unanimity). In other treatments, no
clear leaders appeared.
We suspect that the emergence of leaders, while certainly a possibility when
communication is available, is group specific.29
6.3. Communication Volume and Outcomes
We now inspect the relation between the volume of communication and the
accuracy of decisions. Table VIII describes the average number of signals, the
average number of overall messages (termed chat length), and the percentage
of messages pertaining to observed signals in all treatments, for group deci-
sions that matched the actual state (so-called correct) and group decisions that
did not match the actual state (so-called incorrect).
As can be seen from the table, while the number of signals transmitted is not
significantly correlated with the groups’ accuracy, the length of conversation as
well as the percentage of signals transmitted within the conversation are signif-
icantly correlated with decision accuracy. Indeed, correct decisions are associ-
ated with shorter communication phases and, consequently, greater fractions
of the conversations being dedicated to the transmission of information.
7. GROUP BEHAVIOR AND SUPERMAJORITIES
One reasoning for the equivalence of voting rules when free-form commu-
nication is available is that agents can simply circumvent the voting rule by
deciding which alternative they would like to implement during deliberations
28Since preference types were rarely revealed as described above, we do not include them in
Figure 1.
29For the jury context, the sessions in which leaders emerged may be particularly germane. In-
deed, in many U.S. courts, a jury foreperson is nominated, either by the jury itself or by the judge.
The jury’s foreperson effectively acts as leader, having control over some of the deliberation pro-
cess as well as serving as the jury’s delegate in all communications with the judge in charge (see,
e.g., Abbott and Batt (1999)).
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TABLE VIII
VOLUME OF CHATS AND DECISION ACCURACY
Homogeneous Heterogeneous Partisan
r = 5 r = 7 r = 9 r = 5 r = 7 r = 9 r = 5 r = 7 r = 9 Wilcoxon
Signals Correct 931 896 1519 1435 1642 857 839 846 855 W = 77,
Incorrect 867 900 933 1760 1714 1083 900 825 911 p< 048
Chat length Correct 2096 1936 3250 2393 4050 3000 1190 1727 1867 W = 57,
Incorrect 3067 4425 3400 3800 4729 3806 3050 2863 3144 p< 001
% signals Correct 044 046 047 060 041 029 070 049 046 W = 54,
Incorrect 028 020 027 046 036 028 030 029 029 p< 0004
and then voting unanimously for that alternative. A slight subtlety arises for
unanimous voting rules for which unanimous choices in the voting stage are
not robust to unilateral deviations (hence, the equivalence pertains only to in-
termediate voting rules, and the unanimous voting rules generate a subset of
outcomes).
Figure 2 depicts the cumulative distribution function corresponding to all
possible supermajorities (5–9) for all treatments. Note that for all of our treat-
ments, the cumulative distribution functions corresponding to the treatments
without communication (solid lines) are stochastically dominated by those cor-
responding to treatments with communication (dashed lines). Furthermore,
the cumulative distribution functions relating to the no-communication treat-
ments are concave, while those relating to the communication treatments are
convex. This captures the fact that when communication is not available, most
outcomes are achieved with small supermajorities (in fact, the modal outcome
is achieved with a 5 or 6 supermajority), while with communication most out-
comes are achieved with large supermajorities (indeed, the modal outcomes
are achieved with 8 or 9 supermajorities).
Table VII illustrated a high percentage of subjects revealing their signals
truthfully. Furthermore, Table VI demonstrated the match between group de-
cisions and the majority of reports in the communication stage. These numbers
exceed 85% in all treatments with intermediate voting rules. These combined
with the evidence captured in Figure 2 are suggestive of a heuristic process un-
derlying the groups’ decision-making algorithm. Namely, subjects share their
private information and then unanimously (or almost unanimously) select the
alternative supported by the majority of the signals.
8. CONCLUSIONS
We report observations from an array of experiments that assess the joint im-
pacts of heterogeneous preferences, voting rules, and the availability of com-
munication on group (jury) outcomes. Several important insights emerge from
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FIGURE 2.—Cumulative distribution functions for size of supermajorities acting in consensus.
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our analysis. First, in the absence of communication, individuals behave strate-
gically much in the spirit of theoretical jury models and, consequently, different
voting rules yield different outcomes. Second, deliberation makes voting rules
less crucial for outcomes, particularly non-unanimous ones. This is especially
true when preferences of individuals are aligned. Last, communication proto-
cols have consistent characteristics: messages are public and truthful, they are
a powerful determinant of the collective choice, and they are broadly divided
into two phases: first, information is shared and next, a discussion ensues as to
how to aggregate that information into a group decision.
The observed similarity in outcomes for non-unanimous experimental juries
is consistent with the high variance of non-unanimous voting rules specified in
U.S. civil jurisdiction, where non-unanimous decision rules range anywhere
from simple majority to 7/8 majority. Beyond the jury context, the results
are valuable for any collective decision-making in which individuals communi-
cate prior to taking decisions, be it faculty making hiring decisions, managerial
teams making investment decisions, political entities deciding on policies, and
so on and so forth.
The insights of the paper suggest the importance of using communication
as an instrument in institutional design in conjunction with voting rules. In-
deed, imposing restrictions on deliberation protocols may be an important av-
enue for generating desirable collective outcomes. Put differently, while much
of the focus of the literature on collective decision making is on agents who
are pivotal during the voting stage, understanding the agents who are effec-
tively pivotal in the communication stage could be equally important. In fact,
in practice, in many environments, agenda setting plays an important role in
the design of collective decisions. In a way, an agenda can be thought of as
a predetermined communication protocol, which, as the experimental results
advise, may be crucial for generating sought-after outcomes.
In fact, even without restricting protocols, the consistent sequencing of en-
dogenous protocols we observe opens the door to new questions regarding
institutional design. So far, the theoretical literature on deliberative voting has
assumed that communication is either very short (entailing one round of com-
munication, as in Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2005)) or is free-form (as in
Gerardi and Yariv (2007)), much like in the experiments.30
Theoretical results suggests that when communication protocols are unre-
stricted (e.g., Gerardi and Yariv (2007)), intermediate voting rules are equiv-
alent in terms of the set of sequential equilibrium outcomes they generate.
Under unanimity, only a subset of the outcomes that can result with interme-
diate voting rules can be implemented. These results illustrate the potential
30One exception is Lizzeri and Yariv (2011), who studied protocols resembling the two-stage
ones observed in our experiments. In their setup, agents first need to decide when to halt costly
communication that generates public information. Agents then collectively choose an action. The
paper identifies environments in which different decision rules generate identical predictions.
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effects of communication on collective outcomes, but offer little guidance on
the precise product of the collective process. Our experimental results suggest
stronger impacts of communication: the selected outcomes are the same across
institutions.
We suspect that this is due to the particular format the observed (endoge-
nous) communication protocols take. In that respect, our study suggests the
importance of comparing different institutions with protocols that are in be-
tween the two polar specifications commonly studied: one-shot and fully unre-
stricted.
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